News #2 · · 5 min read · US export controls on advanced chips
Who can reach the chip?
The rule follows the compute. The US already controlled where advanced chips were shipped. Now it also controls who uses them inside data centres abroad, and adds a licence for five countries.
Who feels it and how
RIN 0694-AK50 lands on two layers: the countries chips travel to, and the businesses that build, ship, host and use them.
Countries
D:5 states and Macau
Their companies lose large-scale remote access to US chips in data centres abroad, including through a middleman that trains models for them.
Section 744.24(a)(1)The United States
Buyers headquartered in the US are exempt from the five-country licence, if the exporter reports each sale to BIS monthly.
Section 743.10Industry players
Data centres
- A licence above 12,000,000 TPP for D:5 or Macau companies
- Linked sites count as one
- Must know owners and parent companies
Exporters and resellers
- Must obtain the data centre's customer checks
- No answer counts as a red flag
- Must warn buyers a licence may follow
Foundries and packagers
- Advanced logic chips are presumed controlled
- Designers tied to D:1, D:4, D:5 or the five cannot help clear them
Model developers
- Training models for a D:5 company on rented compute counts as access for it
- Recommender systems only rank, filter or suggest and stay outside
Export control becomes access control.
When it bites
It takes effect on publication in the Federal Register, reported for 19 November 2026. The 60 and 90 days run from that date.
What it means in short
The licence follows use
not only the shipment. Who reaches the compute now matters.
Volume is what counts
Not the share: 12,000,000 TPP to D:5 companies is enough, whatever else a data centre does.
Data centres turn gatekeeper
they must know their customers' owners and parent companies.
Not only Southeast Asia
Brazil's place on the list shows any large compute market can be a route.
Still open
Two readings of one carve-out
The preamble gives recommender systems 90 days and then a licence. Section 744.24(b)(2) exempts them outright once a report is filed. The comment period is where this gets settled.
On the record: Malaysia seized 30 AI servers at KLIA in October. See the Conflict Radar.
Read further on the region
Commentary and coverage gathered by the SMU Centre for Digital Law, most of it with Assoc Prof Liu Han-Wei.
Singapore's silicon statecraft: doctrinal independence through substitution under US extraterritorial export controls
Han-Wei Liu (SMU) argues Singapore keeps its list-based regime and tackles chip diversion through general criminal law such as fraud, rather than adopting US controls.
Read ↗CNA Explains: why is the US targeting Southeast Asia in its bid to curb China's access to AI chips?
What the new rule could mean for data centres in Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand.
Read ↗Nvidia-Megaspeed saga could squeeze Singapore's room in chips space, slow things for firms: analysts
On Megaspeed, a Singapore-based Nvidia client suspected of helping China reach US chips.
Read ↗Billions in Nvidia chips: how Singapore became a hub for a smuggling ring
Traces the Megaspeed case and the police investigation in Singapore.
Read ↗A Singapore firm caught in the US-China squeeze on AI compute
Draws on Liu's research: Singapore prefers its own laws on transshipment and fraud to adopting US rules wholesale.
Read ↗Moving up, locked in: the hidden costs of ASEAN's semiconductor push
The pressures on Southeast Asia's semiconductor hubs as they climb the value chain.
Read ↗The round-up: Liu Han-Wei on US chip controls and Southeast Asia
The post that gathers these pieces: controls moving from chip shipments to who uses the compute.
Read ↗